Visibility of social security contributions and employment by Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Kortajarene
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
p
a
p
e
r
s
W
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
p
a
p
e
r
s
n
g
 
p
a
p
e
r
s
Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe
Visibility of social security
contributions and employment ad
serie
 WP-AD 2011-16 
 
 
 
Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie AD es continuadora de la labor iniciada por el Departamento de 
Fundamentos de Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Alicante en su 
colección “A DISCUSIÓN” y difunde trabajos de marcado contenido teórico. 
Esta serie es coordinada por Carmen Herrero. 
 
The AD series, coordinated by Carmen Herrero, is a continuation of the work 
initiated by the Department of Economic Analysis of the Universidad de 
Alicante in its collection “A DISCUSIÓN”, providing and distributing papers 
marked by their theoretical content. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 
publishing in our series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-2808-2011 
 
Impreso en España (julio 2011) / Printed in Spain (July 2011)   
  3
WP-AD 2011-16 
 
Visibility of social security  
contributions and 
employment
* 
 
Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe**
 
 
 
Abstract 
Social security contributions in most countries are split between employers and employees. 
According to standard incidence analysis, social security contributions affect employment 
negatively, but it is irrelevant how they are divided between employers and employees. This paper 
considers the possibility that: (i) workers perceive a linkage between current contributions and 
future benefits and, (ii) they discount employers contributions more heavily, as they are less 
“visible”. Under these assumptions, I find that employer contributions have a stronger (negative) 
effect on employment than employee contributions. Furthermore, a change in how contributions 
are divided that reduces the share of employers is beneficial for employment. Finally, making 
employers contributions more visible to workers also has a positive effect on employment. 
 
Keywords: Payroll tax, social security, tax incidence, tax visibility. 
 
JEL classification: D03, H22, H55, J08. 
                                                 
*Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de 
Alicante, E-03071, Alicante, Spain. E-mail: iturbe@merlin.fae.ua.es. I would like to thank Juan José 
Dolado and Miguel-Angel López García for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support 
from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas and Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación and 
FEDER funds (project SEJ-2007-62656) are gratefully acknowledged. 1 Introduction
Tax incidence studies the e⁄ect of taxes on the distribution of welfare in a
society. Its basic insight is that the person who really pays the tax may not be
the person who has the legal obligation to make a tax payment (see Fullerton
and Metcalf (2002)). For example, if government taxes capital, owners of
capital can pass on some or even all of the tax to consumers through higher
prices or to workers through lower wages. Economists distinguish between
statutory incidence, i.e. who is legally responsible for the tax, and economic
incidence, i.e. the change in the distribution of welfare induced by the tax.
They di⁄er in that individuals react to taxes by changing their behavior
and, consequently, equilibrium prices may also change. As another example,
think of payroll taxes. In the USA, the statutory burden of the payroll tax is
the same for employers and employees. However, it is generally agreed that
the economic burden is borne entirely by workers.1 It is not surprising that
economists mainly focus on economic incidence.
The textbook prediction of economic theory is that, when markets are
competitive, the economic incidence of a tax will be determined by the elas-
ticities of demand and supply, but not by statutory incidence.2 In the context
of the labor market, this implies that an increase of contributions paid by
employers has the same negative e⁄ect on the employment level as an in-
crease of the same size in contributions paid by employees. Moreover, any
change in how contributions are split between employers and employees that
keeps the total level of contribution ￿xed, has no e⁄ect either on the level of
employment or on the total cost of labor.3 Quoting SalaniØ (2003, p. 16):
￿Whether the employer ￿pays￿80 percent or 50 percent or 20 percent of
1Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
2Statutory incidence matters for real incidence when there is a (binding) minimum
price.
3This result does not extend to non-competitive labor markets. See, for example,
Pissarides (1998) and Koskela and Sch￿b (1999).
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4payroll taxes is immaterial to the equilibrium gross and net wages and to the
determination of employment.￿
I here challenge this view in a purely competitive labor market. I ￿nd that
the particular way in which payroll taxes are split between employers and
employees truly matters, both for gross and net wages and for employment.
To obtain this result I depart from standard analysis by introducing two
assumptions:
1. Workers may perceive these taxes paid as equivalent to deferred pay-
ments and, therefore, not as pure taxes.
2. Workers value contributions paid by themselves more than those paid
by employers, the reason being that the latter are less ￿visible￿to them.
The ￿rst assumption is fairly standard in the literature of public pen-
sions.4 The government uses the revenue collected from payroll taxes to
￿nance di⁄erent public programs that bene￿t workers. Workers may per-
ceive a linkage between taxes paid today and future bene￿ts. Taken to the
extreme, if workers perceive future bene￿ts as actuarial, payroll taxes will
have no distortionary e⁄ects.
Some authors have tried to calculate how contributions and future bene-
￿ts are related for di⁄erent individuals. For example, Feldstein and Samwick
(1992) calculate net marginal tax rates as the di⁄erence between the payroll
tax rate and the discounted value of the additional social security bene￿ts
per dollar of additional earnings for di⁄erent individuals. Disney (2004) es-
timates measures of the tax component and the saving component of public
pension systems across the OECD countries.
The second assumption deserves more discussion. I begin by noting that
in most countries employers and employees share the statutory burden of
4See, for instance, Feldstein and Liebman (2002). Some earlier examples are Summers
(1989) and Gruber (1997).
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5the payroll tax. In Figure A.1, I represent contributions paid by employers
and employees in the OECD countries. Average contribution by employers
is 15.2%, while it is 8.6% for employees. The ratio of the employer contri-
bution to the sum of the employer and the employee contribution is likewise
constructed. This ratio ranges from 0.05 (Denmark) to 1 (Australia) in the
sample of OECD countries, with a mean of 0.6. Contrary to employees, em-
ployers should perceive their part of the payroll tax as a pure tax, as they
do not get any future bene￿t from it and, as long as they can, they will
try to shift the burden of the tax to their employees. Whether they will be
successful or not will depend on the corresponding elasticities of supply and
demand, as commented above.
Regarding employees, they may give some value to payroll taxes, but
they may value taxes paid by the employer di⁄erently from taxes paid by
themselves. One reason for this is that they may not be fully aware of taxes
paid by the employer on their behalf, or they may not know the true size
of those taxes. There is some evidence pointing out in this direction. In
a very interesting paper, Boeri, B￿rsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) survey
the opinions of citizens in four European countries (France, Germany, Italy
and Spain) on their welfare states and also on di⁄erent possibilities of re-
form. When people are asked to report the fraction of their wages that both
employers and employees pay as social security contributions, they tend to
underestimate the true contribution rates. The most striking case is Spain.
Half of individuals do not even answer the question. Of those who answer,
more than two thirds choose a contribution rate far below the true value.5
One possible explanation for this underestimation is that workers are only
fully aware of the contributions paid by themselves, but ignore or are not
very sure about the size of contributions paid by employers. In Spain, for
5In another survey conducted by the same authors in Germany and Italy, only 20% of
respondents know the overall (employer plus employee) contribution rate approximately.
See Tabellini, B￿rsch-Supan and Boeri (2002).
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6instance, contributions paid by employers do not even appear in the payroll
statements that employees receive every month with their wages. Their own
contributions are, on the contrary, fully re￿ ected. This is related to the lit-
erature on the ￿visibility￿of taxes that goes back to Buchanan and Wagner
(1977). In particular, di⁄erent authors have studied whether or not the shar-
ing of payroll taxes is irrelevant. Du￿ ek (2002) ￿nds that, contrary to his
initial intuition, countries where employer￿ s share is large tend to have small
pension programs. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2010) ￿nd that the
employer￿ s share is slightly higher in democracies than in nondemocracies.6
They also ￿nd that the share paid by the employee has a positive e⁄ect on
the size of the program, although this e⁄ect is rather small. Recently, Chetty,
Looney and Kroft (2009) have coined the term ￿salience￿to refer to those
taxes that are less visible for consumers. They ￿nd that the salience of taxes
a⁄ects consumers￿purchase decisions.7
The argument of this paper is this: workers may not fully consider contri-
butions paid as taxes, since they acknowledge that these taxes give them the
right to future bene￿ts. Additionally, they behave myopically in the sense
that they place a higher value on the contributions paid by themselves than
in the contributions paid by the employers, because the latter are less salient.
In Section 2, I show that, provided workers value contributions, but em-
ployer contributions are less salient for them, the negative e⁄ect of taxes on
employment is stronger for employer contributions than for employee contri-
butions. Moreover, if contributions paid by the employer are reduced and, at
the same time, contributions paid by the employee raised so that the level of
total contribution remains unchanged, the equilibrium level of employment
will unambiguously rise. Not only this, this policy change also increases tax
revenue. In Section 3, I see that making employer contributions more visible
6See also Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
7See also Chetty (2009), Finkelstein (2009), Goldin and Homono⁄ (2010), and Cabral
and Hoxby (2011).
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7is always bene￿cial for employment. In Section 4 I present some empirical
evidence for the OECD countries. Section 5 concludes. Finally, in the Ap-
pendix, I consider a right-to-manage model in which a trade union and a
￿rm bargain over wages while the ￿rm chooses the level of employment and
I prove that the main result can be extended to this alternative set-up.
2 Partial equilibrium: the competitive case
To illustrate my argument I will use the simplest possible model of a com-
petitive labor market. Labor demand is D(wF); where wF = w(1 + ￿F) and
D0(￿) ￿ 0: Here wF is total labor cost for the ￿rm, w is the wage that the
￿rm pays to workers, and ￿F is the payroll tax rate paid by the ￿rm. Then,
￿Fw is the value of social security contributions paid by the ￿rm. I want to
stress that what matters for ￿rms is wF; not w:
Workers receive a net wage wN = (1￿￿W)w; where ￿W is the payroll tax
rate paid by workers. The value of social security contributions paid by the
worker is ￿Ww; and ￿w = (￿F + ￿W)w is total revenue of the social security
administration. In a standard labor market model, labor supply would be
S(wN); with S0(￿) ￿ 0: As I said in the Introduction, I depart from this stan-
dard formulation in two directions. First, workers may perceive contributions
as deferred payments, since those contributions are buying them some future
bene￿ts. These can be in the form of insurance (unemployment or health
insurance) or of future bene￿ts (pensions). Since these bene￿ts will be col-
lected in the future, workers discount them by a factor ￿. This parameter
￿ captures the strength of the perceived linkage between contributions and
bene￿ts. It re￿ ects not only pure discounting, but also institutional features
of social security. For instance, how close to an actuarially fair scheme is the
social security system. If bene￿ts are strictly proportional to contributions,
all workers will have similar values of ￿: If social security is progressive, low-
skilled workers may have a higher value of ￿ than high-skilled workers. The
7
8case ￿ = 0 corresponds to a situation in which social security contributions
are perceived as pure taxes. In many countries this can be the case for young
workers since their current earnings will not enter the formula used to cal-
culate their future retirement bene￿ts. This could likewise be the case of
low-skilled workers who will qualify for a minimum pension.
Second, contributions paid by the worker and contributions paid by the
￿rm may not be equally visible (￿salient￿ , following the terminology in
Chetty et al (2009)). Workers know better their own contributions, because
they see every month the particular amounts paid in the income statement
(pay slip) they receive. In some countries, on the contrary, they do not
observe the amounts paid on their behalf by ￿rms as social security contri-
butions, or they do not observe it as easily as their own contributions. This
happens, for instance, in Spain.8 It is not surprising, therefore, to ￿nd that
when individuals are asked to report the total value of social security con-
tributions they fail to give a correct answer. Boeri et al. (2001) found that
workers tend to underestimate the total value of social security contribu-
tions. They surveyed 5,500 Europeans on the welfare state. The survey was
conducted in 4 countries: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. One question
asked for an estimate of the combined employer and employee contribution.
The questions was: ￿As you know, both employers and employees pay pen-
sion contributions. Which fraction of your gross monthly wage goes to public
pensions? (Please take into account also your employer contributions).￿Sev-
eral brackets were suggested. In Spain, the brackets were 0-21, 21-35, 35+.
The correct answer is 21-35. Half of individuals did not answer the question.
Among those who answered (49.2%), only 28% answered correctly while 68%
chose the ￿rst bracket (0-21).
Recently, Fundaci￿n Edad y Vida questioned a sample of 1,200 individ-
8There are countries in which workers also receive information on contributions paid
by their employers. In the USA workers get this information in their Social Security
Statements. Unfortunately, the Social Security Administration has recently decided to
stop mailing the statements due to budgetary restrictions.
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9uals about their knowledge of the welfare state in Spain and about di⁄erent
reform proposals. According to the answers, individuals seem to over-value
worker contributions and under-value employer contributions. In particular,
one question asks for an estimate of the contributions paid by the worker.
Only 26% of respondents answer correctly. Interestingly, 30% choose a value
above the correct one, while only 2.5% choose a value below the correct one.
The remaining 41% do not answer the question. Another question asks for
the combined employer and employee contribution. Most individuals do not
answer (65%). Of those who answer (35%), only 44% choose the right an-
swer, 34% choose a value below the correct one and 22% choose a value above
the correct one.9
My reading of these surveys is that individuals seem to give more weight
to worker contributions that to employer contributions. To model this asym-
metry, I introduce a parameter ￿ that takes values between 0 and 1 and that
multiplies contributions paid by the ￿rm. This parameter captures how visi-
ble (￿salient￿ ) are employer contributions. The higher is ￿; the more ￿visible￿
they are. When ￿ = 1, they are equally visible for the worker as are worker￿ s
contributions. When ￿ = 0 they are not visible at all.
Summing up, I assume that labor supply is S(wW); where wW = (1 ￿
￿W)w + ￿(￿W + ￿￿F)w and S0(￿) ￿ 0: This formulation can be seen as a re-
parametrization of Gruber (1997).10 Employee contributions are discounted
by a factor ￿; while employer contributions are discounted by ￿￿: To save
notation, I de￿ne ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿W) + ￿(￿W + ￿￿F): Then, wW = ￿w: If ￿ = 0;
we are back to the standard model of labor supply.
9See Dom￿nguez et al. (2010).
10Using my notation, Gruber (1997) de￿nes labor supply as:
S = S((1 ￿ a￿W)w + q￿Fw);
where a and q re￿ ect how workers discount their contributions relative to cash income
and how they value employer contributions relative to cash income, respectively. I get my
formulation by setting a = 1 ￿ ￿; and q = ￿￿:
9
10At the market equilibrium D(w(1+￿F)) ￿ S(￿w): I consider changes in
￿F and ￿W and compare how they a⁄ect the equilibrium level of employment.
I begin by studying the e⁄ect of a change in ￿F: I di⁄erentiate completely
the equilibrium condition to get:
D
0(dw(1 + ￿F) + wd￿F) ￿ S
0(dw￿ + wd￿): (1)
Since d￿ = ￿￿d￿F; I can write the above expression as:
D
0(
dw
wd￿F
(1 + ￿F) + 1) ￿ S
0(
dw
wd￿F
￿ + ￿￿): (2)
Given that dw
wd￿F = dlnw
d￿F ; I have:
dlnw
d￿F
(￿S
0 ￿ (1 + ￿F)D
0) ￿ D
0 ￿ ￿￿S
0: (3)
The wage elasticities of labor demand and supply (in absolute value) are
"D = ￿D0 w
D and "S = S0 w
S; respectively. Then:
dlnw
d￿F
= ￿
"D + ￿￿"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (4)
Since
dlnwF
d￿F = dlnw
d￿F + 1
1+￿F ; the e⁄ect on total labor costs is:
dlnwF
d￿F
=
(1 ￿ ￿W(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿)"S
(1 + ￿F)(￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D)
: (5)
The e⁄ect of a change in ￿F on the equilibrium level of employment is:
dlnL
d￿F
= ￿
"D"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(1 ￿ ￿W(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿): (6)
This derivative of (5) is positive and the derivative of (6) is negative.11 This
is not surprising, a rise in ￿F increases total labor costs and reduces employ-
ment.
11To check this, note that we need 1 ￿ ￿W(1￿￿)+￿￿: The term on the right reaches a
global maximum when ￿ = ￿ = 1; in which case its value is 1. In all other cases, its value
is below 1.
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11I then study the e⁄ect of a change in employee contributions ￿W: In a
similar way to the above, I obtain:
dlnwF
d￿W
=
dlnw
d￿W
=
(1 ￿ ￿)"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
; (7)
which is positive. Finally, the e⁄ect on the level of employment is:
dlnL
d￿W
= ￿
"D"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿F); (8)
which has a negative sign, as dlnL
d￿F . Again, a rise in ￿W increases labor costs
and reduces employment.
I now move on to compare the e⁄ect of a change in ￿F on employment
with a change of the same size in ￿W. That is, we compare dlnL
d￿F with dlnL
d￿W :
If all social security contributions are perceived as pure taxes, i.e. ￿ = 0;
these two e⁄ects are approximately the same, as long as both ￿F and ￿W
are small.12 This is the standard result saying that the e⁄ect of an increase
in ￿F is equal to the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿W, since economic incidence is
determined only by the elasticities of supply and demand.
The interesting case is when ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 1: Comparing dlnL
d￿F and dlnL
d￿W ;
we ￿nd that the ￿rst one is always higher in absolute terms, as long as the
parameter ￿ is below a certain threshold b ￿. In particular, the condition is:
￿ < b ￿ =
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿
: (9)
Note that
￿
￿ ￿
dlnL
d￿F
￿ ￿ ￿ >
￿ ￿ ￿
dlnL
d￿W
￿ ￿ ￿ means that a 1% increase in ￿F is more detrimental
to the level of employment than a 1% increase in ￿W: This same condition
12In particular, when ￿ = 0; Expressions (6) and (8) become, respectively:
dlnL
d￿F
= ￿
"D"S
(1 ￿ ￿W)"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(1 ￿ ￿W);
and:
dlnL
d￿W
= ￿
"D"S
(1 ￿ ￿W)"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(1 + ￿F):
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12guarantees that
dlnwF
d￿F >
dlnwF
d￿W : a 1% increase in ￿F raises more total labor
costs wF than a 1% increase in ￿W:
If ￿ = 1 or ￿ < ￿
1+￿; Condition (9) cannot be satis￿ed.13 That is, two
necessary conditions for the result are ￿ < 1; employer contributions are less
visible than employee contributions, and ￿ ￿ ￿
1+￿; workers give some value
to contributions paid by themselves. In Table 1 below I show the value of b ￿
for several combinations of ￿ and ￿:
￿ = 0:25 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:75
￿ = 0:1 0:7 0:9 0:97
￿ = 0:2 0:4 0:8 0:93
￿ = 0:3 0:1 0:7 0:9
Table 1: The threshold b ￿
Condition (9) is weaker the lower ￿ is and the higher ￿ is: Figure 1 repre-
sents combinations of parameters ￿ and ￿ that satisfy the condition. The two
lines in the ￿gure correspond to two di⁄erent values ￿ and ￿0; where ￿0 > ￿:
Once a value of ￿ is ￿xed; the region where the condition holds is the one to
the left of the corresponding line. That is, for a ￿xed value of ￿; the parame-
ter ￿ cannot be too large. Note also that the standard case in which ￿ = 0;
corresponds to the segment in the horizontal axis, where the condition never
holds. The case in which workers ￿nd equally visible employer and employee
contributions corresponds to the vertical segment where ￿ = 1: The condition
does not hold yet again here.
To sum up, provided that Condition (9) holds, a reduction of ￿F has
a more positive e⁄ect on employment than a comparable reduction of ￿W:
13If ￿ < ￿
1+￿ ; then b ￿ < 0:
12
13t’ /(1+t’ )
t/(1+t)
              0
d
q
1
1
Figure 1: Region where Condition (9) holds
Interestingly, if social security is progressive, Condition (9) is more likely to
hold for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. The reason is that
the former may have a higher value of ￿; since the system is progressive, and
a lower value of ￿; as they may be more myopic than high-skilled workers.
An additional and very important implication of the analysis above is
the following. Suppose we change the way in which contributions are split
between the worker and the ￿rm. In particular, consider that employer con-
tributions are reduced and employee contributions are increased, with total
contributions being kept constant. That is, I consider a policy change in
which d￿F = ￿d￿W < 0; so that the total tax ￿ remains unchanged. I ￿nd
that, if Condition (9) holds, this policy change reduces total labor costs for
￿rms and has, therefore, a positive e⁄ect on employment.
Given that ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿W) + ￿(￿W + ￿￿F); if d￿F = ￿d￿W then d￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)d￿F: Then:
dlnw
d￿F
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
= ￿
"D + "S(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (10)
13
14The e⁄ect on total labor cost wF = w(1 + ￿F) is:
dlnwF
d￿F
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
=
"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
1 + ￿F
: (11)
Finally, the e⁄ect on employment is:
dlnL
d￿F
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
= ￿
"D"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
(￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿)
1 + ￿F
: (12)
In a standard model, all social security contributions are perceived as pure
taxes, i.e. ￿ = 0: Then:
dlnw
d￿F
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
= ￿
"D + "S
(1 ￿ ￿W)"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (13)
This term is approximately -1, as long as ￿W and ￿F are not very large. This
is the classical result of full shifting where the equilibrium wage depends
only on the value of ￿; and not on how this tax is split between employers
and employees. Additionally, when ￿ = 0 the remaining expressions above
become, respectively:
dlnwF
d￿F
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
= ￿
￿
1 + ￿F
"S
(1 ￿ ￿W)"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
;
and:
dlnL
d￿F
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
d￿F=￿d￿W
=
￿
1 + ￿F
"D"S
(1 ￿ ￿W)"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (14)
When ￿ is small, both terms are approximately zero. As long as total tax
￿ does not change, labor costs wF and employment L are not a⁄ected by
how contributions are split between worker and ￿rm. It does not matter who
bears the statutory burden of the tax.
If, however, the parameter ￿ is strictly positive, the signs of the derivatives
in Equations (11) and (12) are determined by the sign of the term ￿(1￿￿)￿
(1￿￿)￿: In particular, if this term is positive, the expression in Equation (11)
is positive and the expression in Equation (12) is negative. That is, shifting
some part of the contributions from employers to employees, while holding
14
15￿xed the total contribution rate, reduces total labor costs for the ￿rm and,
thus, has a positive e⁄ect on employment. Not surprisingly, Condition (9) is
precisely the same as ￿(1￿￿)￿(1￿￿)￿ > 0: Finally, when ￿ > 0 I also ￿nd
that the e⁄ect on w does not entail full shifting. In fact, the lower is ￿; the
smaller the term dlnw
d￿F will be (in absolute value).
Figure 2 illustrates the e⁄ect of shifting part of employer contributions
to employees and can be used to see the intuition behind the result. Dotted
lines D(w) and S(w) represent labor demand and supply in the absence of
taxes. Bold lines D(w(1 + ￿F)) and S(￿w) represent the initial situation. I
then reduce ￿F and raise ￿W; holding constant the sum ￿ = ￿F + ￿W: Since
contributions are perceived as pure taxes by ￿rms, the reduction of ￿F to ￿0
F
has a positive e⁄ect on employment represented by the shift to the right of
labor demand. The rise in worker contributions, from ￿W to ￿0
W, is negative
for employment and I represent this with the shift to the left of labor supply.
In standard models these two e⁄ects cancel each other, and total employment
remains unchanged. In my model, if Condition (9) holds, this change in the
split raises the ￿visible￿part of contributions, implying that the (negative)
e⁄ect on supply is always smaller in size than the (positive) e⁄ect on demand.
The overall e⁄ect on employment is positive. In the ￿gure it goes from L to
L0: We also observe the reduction in wF and the rise in wW.
The rise in wW may seem counterintuitive. However, recall that wW does
not only represent the net wage that workers get, but also the value that
workers give to their future bene￿ts. In fact, the net wage wN becomes lower
with the above change in the split, .
Finally, a brief comment on the e⁄ect on tax revenue. Since tax collection
is simply (￿W + ￿F)wL; it is easy to see that the above change in the split
has also a positive e⁄ect on tax collection. By de￿nition, the sum ￿W + ￿F
remains constant, while w and L increase.
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Figure 2: A reduction on employer￿ s contributions
3 Making employer contributions more visi-
ble
I here explore the e⁄ect of a simple policy that consists in making employer
contributions more visible to workers. One example in this line was the
decision of the Social Security Administration in the USA to send the so-
called Social Security Statement to all workers paying payroll taxes.14 The
Social Security Statement of a ￿ctional worker, called ￿Wanda Worker,￿can
be downloaded from the US Social Security website. It contains a detailed
account of taxes paid both by the worker and by her employers throughout
her full working career to present.
A similar idea could be easily implemented in other countries, such as
Spain, at a low cost. Another possibility could be to include information
about employer contributions in the monthly statements that workers receive.
In terms of my simple model, this would amount to raise the value of ￿: With
14See Mastrobuoni (2011).
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17a similar procedure to the one I have used above, I get:
dlnwF
d￿
=
￿￿￿F(1 + ￿F)"S
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (15)
Using the fact that dlnL
d￿ = ￿"D
dlnwF
d￿ ; I get:
dlnL
d￿
=
￿￿F(1 + ￿F)"S"D
￿"S + (1 + ￿F)"D
: (16)
As long as the term ￿￿F is positive, the expression in (15) is negative and
the expression in (16) is positive. The intuition is straightforward. Making
employer contributions more visible to workers has no e⁄ect on labor demand,
but it has a positive e⁄ect on supply, as long as ￿rms pay contributions
(￿F > 0) and workers give them some value (￿ > 0). This will have a positive
e⁄ect on employment, while at the same time reducing labor costs for ￿rms.
This e⁄ect is illustrated in Figure 3 below, where the e⁄ect of this measure is
to move labor supply to the right. This is a policy measure that entails few
costs and that can prove useful for increasing employment. In fact, this was
one of the proposals in the report that the Swedish government commissioned
to analyze the country￿ s economic crisis in the Nineties. Quoting the report:
￿42. Taxes should be made as visible as possible; they should also be called
taxes and not fees; the gross wage, including payroll taxes, should be reported
along with the wage payment.￿(Lindbeck et al. (1994, p. 103))
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, I collect some cross country data to illustrate the results on
previous sections using information of the OECD countries. Unfortunately,
there is no available cross country information on the visibility of social secu-
rity contributions. The survey made by Boeri, B￿rsch-Supan, and Tabellini
(2001) has information only for four European countries. My results below,
therefore, can be seen as an illustration corresponding to the case in which
all countries share the same value of ￿:
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Figure 3: Making employer contributions more visible
Table 2 contains data on employer and employee contributions for 30
OECD countries, together with data on Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL), net replacement rates, average income taxes and employment levels.
The values for EPL are built by the OECD combining several sources. It takes
values from 0 to 4. The higher the value, the more stringent employment
protection is. The country with the highest value of EPL is Turkey (3.46)
and the one with the lowest value is the US (0.85). The net replacement
rate gives the individual pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement
earnings, taking into account the payment of income taxes and social security
contributions by workers and pensioners. Employment rates are calculated as
the ratio between the number of workers and the total number of individuals
in working age. I disaggregate employment rates by gender.
18
19Table 2: Summary Statistics, 30 OECD countries 2008
Variable Min Max Mean StDv
Employee contribution 0 18:13 8:65 4:85
Employer contribution 0 29:73 15:18 7:92
Income tax 3:31 30:14 13:57 6:27
EPL 0:85 3:46 2:23 0:71
Net replacement rate 0:29 1:14 0:72 0:26
Employment rate (male)+ 61:67 88:68 75:57 6:67
Employment rate (female)+ 24:93 79:90 61:48 11:56
Employment rate (total)+ 45:49 82:16 68:49 8:33
Source: OECD (+: Year 2009)
I run three simple regressions using the logarithms of employment rates
as endogenous variables. Employer contributions, employee contributions,
income taxes, net replacement rates and EPL are used as controls. Results
are shown in Table 3. The corresponding standard deviations are shown is
brackets.
Table 3: Endogenous variable is log of employment rate
Male Female All
Employer cont. ￿:0065￿￿￿ (:0023) :0011 (:0060) ￿:0035 (:0034)
Employee cont. :0001 (:0032) :0011 (:0082) :0006 (:0047)
Income tax ￿:0011 (:0024) :0118￿ (:0062) :0046 (:0035)
EPL :0129 (:0261) ￿:1246￿ (:0675) ￿:0418 (:0384)
Net repl. rate ￿:0767 (:0735) ￿:1180 (:1901) ￿:0875 (:1081)
Constant 4:4602￿￿￿ (:0677) 4:2735￿￿￿ (:1750) 4:3611￿￿￿ (:0995)
R2 :418 :3941 :3942
Standard errors in brackets. *** and * denote signi￿cance at 1% and 10%.
We see that the coe¢ cient of employer contributions is negative and
highly signi￿cant in the ￿rst regression, where the endogenous variable is
19
20male employment. With female employment, only income tax and EPL are
signi￿cant at a 10% level. The ￿rst is positive, while the second is negative.
Regarding the negative e⁄ect of employer contributions on male employment,
this result holds even when I control for other factors that may a⁄ect employ-
ment, such as replacement rates and EPL. Regarding employee contributions,
I do not ￿nd any signi￿cant e⁄ect on employment.
Clearly, this is a very rough approach, since we do not have information
on visibility in di⁄erent countries. However, I can use the results of the ￿rst
regression to illustrate slightly further the e⁄ect found of employer contribu-
tions on male employment. The interpretation of the estimated value means
that a reduction of one point in employer contributions, for example from
￿F = 15:18 to ￿0
F = 14:18 raises male employment by approximately 0.65
points. This seems to be a sizable increase.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I ￿nd that, contrary to the prediction of standard economic
theory, the way in which social security contributions are split between em-
ployers and employees a⁄ects the level of employment. In particular, I ￿nd
that contributions paid by ￿rms are more harmful for employment than con-
tributions paid by workers. To obtain this result I need two conditions.
First, workers must attach some value to social security contributions. Sec-
ond, workers must value their own contributions more than those paid by
employers. Additionally, under these conditions, a reduction of employer
contributions that goes together with a corresponding increase of employee
contributions, leaving unchanged total contributions, is always positive for
employment. Finally, I also ￿nd that making the contributions paid by em-
ployers more visible is always bene￿cial for employment.
There are several potential drawbacks to my approach. One is that I
am considering just one representative individual. In a model with hetero-
20
21geneous individuals, the results could be potentially di⁄erent, since di⁄erent
individuals may su⁄er from di⁄erent degrees of myopia.
Another criticism is that I am assuming a competitive labor market and
this does not seem very realistic for many countries, in particular for most
European countries. However, in the Appendix of the paper I present a
standard right-to-manage model in which a representative ￿rm and a repre-
sentative union bargain over wages, while the level of employment is ￿xed by
the ￿rm. I ￿nd that the results of Section 2 extend easily to this setup.
21
22Appendix: A Right-to-manage model
Here I build a very simple right-to-manage model. This model was orig-
inally developed by Nickell and Andrews (1983).15 The main idea is that
unions have market power and they bargain over wages with ￿rms. Taking
wages as given, ￿rms choose optimally the amount of labor. Since wages
are higher than in a competitive market, the employment level is lower and
unemployment arises.
As is standard in the literature, I assume that the outcome of the model
is the solution of a maximization problem corresponding to an asymmetric
Nash bargaining problem as follows:
max
w [u ￿ u]
￿ [￿ ￿ ￿]
1￿￿ ; (17)
where u is the utility function that maximizes the union, ￿ is the pro￿t of
the ￿rm, ￿ represents the relative bargaining power of the union, and (u;￿)
is the disagreement point. This point corresponds to the situation when the
union and the ￿rm do not reach an agreement. I then de￿ne the pro￿t of the
￿rm and the utility of the union.
There is one ￿rm that uses labor as the unique input to produce. The
output market is perfectly competitive and I normalize output price to 1.16
In particular, the production function is:
q(L) =
￿L
1 ￿ ￿
1￿￿
; (18)
where ￿ > 0 and 0 < ￿ < 1: The ￿rm gets pro￿ts:
￿(L) =
￿L
1 ￿ ￿
1￿￿
￿ w(1 + ￿F)L: (19)
Since the ￿rm chooses L; the demand of labor will be:
D(w) =
￿
￿
w(1 + ￿F)
￿ 1
￿
: (20)
15See also Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Boeri and Van Ours (2008).
16This can be easily generalized by introducing another parameter that captures output
elasticity. Here I am implicitly assuming that this elasticity is ￿1:
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23Note that the elasticity of labor demand (in absolute value) is "D = 1
￿:
Normalizing total labor force to 1, the rate of unemployment is U = 1 ￿ L:
In case of disagreement I assume that the ￿rm has no pro￿t, then ￿ = 0:
Regarding the union, I assume that union members are risk neutral and
their objective is to maximize the expected revenue of workers. In case of
disagreement, they get b that can be seen as the wage workers earn in another
sector or as the unemployment bene￿t. Utility is:
u(w;L) = ￿wL + bU: (21)
Here ￿w is as de￿ned in Section 2. Since in case of disagreement workers get
b; net utility for the union is:
u ￿ u = (￿w ￿ b)L: (22)
Collecting all terms, the solution to the model will be the solution of:
max
w [(￿w ￿ b)L]
￿
￿
￿L
1 ￿ ￿
1￿￿
￿ w(1 + ￿F)L
￿1￿￿
; (23)
under the restriction that L = D(w): Solving this problem we obtain that
the equilibrium wage is:
w
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
b: (24)
The equilibrium wage increases with ￿;￿; and b and falls with ￿: I get the
level of employment by substituting w￿ into the labor demand function:
L
￿ =
￿
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿F)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))b
￿1=￿
: (25)
When ￿ is 1, the union has all the bargaining power. The wage and the
level of employment correspond to the monopoly union model. In particular,
when ￿ = 1 I get:
w
￿ =
b
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
and L
￿ =
￿
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿F)b
￿1=￿
: (26)
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24In the other extreme case in which ￿ = 0; I get:
w
￿ =
b
￿
and L
￿ =
￿
￿￿
(1 + ￿F)b
￿1=￿
:
I am interested on the e⁄ect of the split of social security contributions be-
tween the ￿rm and the worker. Using Equation (25) above and noting that
￿W = ￿ ￿ ￿F; I can write the equilibrium employment level as a function of
￿F only. Computing the derivative of L￿ with respect to ￿F I get that this
derivative is negative as long as the term ￿(￿1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿ is negative. It
can be immediately seen that this is exactly Condition (9) from Section 2.
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